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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
"INEVITABLE DISCOVERY" OR INEVITABLE DEMISE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
Nix v. WILLIAMS
104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984)
On June 11, 1984 in the case of Nix v. Williams, the Supreme Court
adopted a further exception to the exclusionary rule, the "inevitable discovery"
doctrine.' The inevitable discovery doctrine permits the admission of evidence
obtained in spite of a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights, where the
prosecution can convince the trier of fact by a preponderance that this
evidence would have been discovered regardless of any suTh violation.'
The Williams case has a long and complicated history, having come to the
Supreme Court on a previous occasion.3 A review of the factual background of
the case is essential in order that it be fully understood.'
On December 24, 1968, a ten year old girl was abducted from the Des
Moines, Iowa YMCA. Witnesses linked Williams, an escaped mental patient,5
to the girl's disappearance.' On Christmas Day the defendant's car was found
about one hundred sixty miles east of Des Moines in the town of Davenport,
Iowa and a warrant for Williams' arrest was issued soon thereafter.7 On the
morning of the 26th Williams called Henry McKnight, his Des Moines at-
torney. Mr. McKnight advised the defendant to surrender and Williams did so
to the Davenport police that same morning.' Meanwhile, attorney McKnight
had gone to the Des Moines Police Department to speak with the authorities
about his client's surrender and imminent return to Des Moines.'
While McKnight was still at the police station Williams called again. In
'Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984). Burger, CI.., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, I.J., joined. White, J., filed a concurring opinion. Stevens, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J.,
joined.
21d. at 2510-11.
3Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
'Because the Court's opinion does not adequately set forth all of the pertinent facts, some of them will be
gleaned from the opinion and order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
which granted Williams' first petition for writ of habeas corpus. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.
Iowa 1974).
'Id. at 173-174.
'1d. at 172.
71d.
'Id.
'Id. at 172-73.
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the presence of one Detective Learning and Police Chief Nichols, McKnight
advised Williams not to speak to the police during the trip back to Des Moines
and that Williams would not be interrogated during the trip." Arrangements
were made whereby Detective Leaming was to pick up the prisoner in Daven-
port and return him to Des Moines. It was expressly agreed between Attorney
McKnight and Detective Leaming that Williams would not be questioned
about the crime during the trip so that the defendant could first consult with
his attorney."
Prior to Leaming's arrival in Davenport, Williams also consulted with
another attorney, Thomas Kelly who also advised the defendant to maintain
silence. 2 After Leaming arrived, Kelly requested permission to accompany
them on the return trip but was refused." Learning though agreed with Kelly
that the defendant would not be questioned during the return trip. Williams
had been given Miranda warnings more than once5 before the start of the trip
but not during the trip itself and he expressly told Leaming that he did not
want to make any statements before talking to his attorney. 6
Despite these statements by the defendant and in spite of two express
agreements with both of Williams' attorneys, Learning initiated a wide ranging
conversation with Williams admittedly'7 with the intention of gaining informa-
'"Id. at 173.
"Id.
121d
"
131d.
141d.
"
5Miranda warnings were given upon Williams' arrest at the Davenport police station, at his arraignment,
and by Detective Leaming prior to the start of the return trip. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 390-91
(1977).
"Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 173 (S.D. 1974). Detective Learning acknowledged that the defen-
dant was represented by counsel, and hinted at an ulterior purpose for the trip with the following statement
to Williams: IWle both know that you're being represented here by Mr. Kelly and you're being represented
by Mr. McKnight in Des Moines, and ... I want you to remember this because we'll be visiting between here
and Des Moines." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 391 (1977).
" n testimony Learning admitted his purpose was to elicit incriminating information from the prisoner:
Q. Now, when you left, just before you left, do you remember we had parted greetings and didn't you
say, 'I'll go get him and bring him right back here to Des Moines'?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said that to me, didn't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Knowing that you were dealing with a person from a mental hospital, did you say to him, you
don't have to tell me this information, did you say that to him out there on the highway?
A. What information?
Q. The information that he gave you, the defendant gave you, you didn't say that to him, did you?
A. No, sir.
Q. In fact, Captain, whether he was a mental patient or not, you were trying to get all the information
you could before he got to his lawyer, weren't you?
A. I was sure hoping to find out where that little girl was, yes, sir.
Q. Well, I'll put it this way: You were hoping to get all the information you could before Williams got
back to McKnight, weren't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 174 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
[Vol. 18:2
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tion about the location of the missing girl's body. The topics discussed included
Williams deep religious convictions'" and that Learning bore no ill will toward
him and would protect him from others.'9 The conversation culminated in the
following "Christian Burial speech by Leaming:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down
the road ... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions,
it's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility
is poor, it's going to be dark early this evening. They are predicting several
inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person
that knows where this little girl's body is, that you yourself have only been
there once, and if you get snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to
find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des
Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of
this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who
was snatched away from them on Christmas [Elve and murdered. And I
feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until
morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not
being able to find it at all.2"
Learning also stated that he "knew" the body was near Mitchellville when in
reality Learning possessed no such knowledge.2
Shortly after the "Christian Burial" speech Williams inquired whether the
girl's shoes had been found.22 Leaming discussed this evidence with the defen-
dant, who led the officers to a gas station where the shoes had been left but the
officers failed to find them.23 The detective and Williams then discussed a
blanket used in the crime and went to a rest area where the blanket had been
left but it too, was not found.2" Learning and Williams then continued the con-
versation about religion and Williams soon said he would show police where
the body was. At this point the volunteers who were searching for the body
were called off6 and Williams directed the police to the little girl's body.27
Following the denial of a motion to suppress and over his counsel's objec-
tions,28 all of Williams' statements and the evidence of the body were admitted
into evidence at his trial. Williams was convicted of murder and on appeal the
"Leaming was aware that Williams was deeply religious. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387. 392 11977).
"Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 174-75 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
"'Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392-93 11977).
"Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2505 (1984).
"Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 175 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
23Id.
24Id.
231d.
'Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2505 (1984).
"Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 175 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
231d.
Fall, 19841
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Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Williams had waived his constitu-
tional rights before making his statements to Learning and therefore the
challenged evidence was admissible.
21
Williams then sought a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa. The district court determined that Williams had
not waived his rights.3" The court also found that the Iowa courts had applied
the wrong constitutional standard in their finding of waiver,3' and that Learn-
ing's actions amounted to interrogation. Therefore, Williams' fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and his sixth amendment right to counsel
were violated.3
2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit heard Iowa's
appeal of the order granting the writ. It found that the district court was "emi-
nently correct" in holding that the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment
rights were violated by Learning's actions and that he had not waived these
rights."
Iowa again appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari.3" In this first appeal to the Supreme Court, (Williams 1), the Court did
not choose to review the case on the basis of Miranda violations, whether the
defendant's statements were involuntarily made or whether his fifth amend-
ment rights were violated."5 The Court instead examined the question of
whether Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel was violated."6
In a five to four decision the Court answered this question in the affir-
mative, finding that Detective Learning acted deliberately in eliciting informa-
tion from Williams thus denying him his right to assistance of counsel." The
Court then reluctantly affirmed the judgments of the district court and the
court of appeals3" but in doing so set the stage for the retrial of Williams
through the use of a footnote."
In this footnote the Court noted that the district court limited its decision
"State v. Williams. 182 N.W.2d 396. 401-02 (Iowa 19711.
"See. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 181-82 (S.D. Iowa 19741. The district court noted that waiver
was a question of law and not of fact, in its determination of the applicability of 28 U.S.C. §2254 11977).
'Id. at 182.
"Id. at 185.
"See. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 i8th (iir. 19741. (The court of appeals did not reach the issue of
whether Williams' statements were involuntarily madel.
11423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
-'.Both the district court and the circuit court of appeals did make such findings. See. Williams v. Brewer, 375
F. Supp. 170 IS.D. Iowa 19741: Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th C'ir. 1974).
'Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 400 11977).
1d. at 397-400
1"1d. at 406.
'Id. at 406-07 n.12.
[Vol. i18:2
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to Williams' incriminating statements alone.'" Here the Court then cryptically
went on to mention that:
[wihile neither Williams' incriminating statements themselves nor any
testimony describing his having led the police to the victim's body can
constitutionally be admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body
was found and of its condition might well be admissible on the theory that
the body would have been discovered in any event, even had in-
criminating statements not been elicited from Williams.4
Because the state courts had admitted Williams' incriminating statements, the
state did not consider whether the physical evidence to which Williams had led
the police might be admissible even if his statements were not. Even though
this issue was not before the Supreme Court, through this footnote the Court
implied that the state might re-try Williams using the physical evidence alone,
without divulging its source. The Court left it to the state to determine
whether this type of evidenciary use was proper but strongly indicated such
use was permissible. 2 Iowa responded in kind with a retrial."
At the second trial, Williams' incriminating statements to Learning were
not admitted into evidence due to the Supreme Court's holding in Williams P.44
However, the trial court did admit the physical evidence discovered as a result
of these statements, on the ground that this evidence would have inevitably
been discovered by the search party.4" Williams was again found guilty.
In an extensive opinion the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction." Before proceeding to that court's ruling, it is necessary to first
consider the nature of the central controvesy in the instant case, the exclu-
sionary rule and particularly the exceptions to it.
The rule, first promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1914,11 renders evi-
dence inadmissible when it is obtained in violation of the Constitution, stat-
utes, or court rules. 8 It was made applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment in 1961.19 The rule is intended to discourage illegal govern-
ment activity in gaining evidence by making that evidence unusable. 0 The rule
Qld.
1ld.
o2ld.
"
3lronically, The Chief Justice found this a remote possibility at the time footnote 12 was written. See Id. at
416-417. n. 1, (Burger, J.. dissentingl.
"Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (19771.
"State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 262 lIowa 1979).
'Id.
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (19141.
"Oaks, Studying the ExclusionarY Rule in Search and Seizure. 37 U. C.i L. REv. 665 119701.
"Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"Maguire, How To Unpoison The Fruit - The Fourth Amendment And The ExchisionarY Rule. 55 J.
CRIM. L. & POUE Sci. 307. 308 (1964).
Fall, 19841
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has always been controversial because guilty persons occasionally go free,
since evidence probative of truth is withheld from the fact-finder when the rule
is applied. Therefore, the interest in deterring unlawful government activity
conflicts with society's interests in being protected from and punishing
criminals."
There are two types of illegally obtained evidence, primary and
derivative. 2 Primary evidence is that which directly results from the illegality,
such as material seized in an illegal search. Derivative evidence is that evidence
obtained through the primary illegality such as the names of witnesses found
in documents illegally seized. 3 When illegally obtained evidence is derivative
in nature it is known as "the fruit of the poisonous tree," the primary evidence
being the "tree" itself. 4 In deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule
courts generally examine how closely the acquisition of the evidence is con-
nected to the illegal conduct of the authorities.
Because of the conflicting interests surrounding the application of the
rule, exceptions to it have evolved. Since the exclusionary rule would be mean-
ingless if primary evidence was admitted, the exceptions necessarily deal with
the admission of derivative evidence, although it too often falls under the um-
brella of the exclusionary rule.5
Again, the exceptions to the rule revolve around the question of how
closely related the constitutional violation is to the incriminating evidence. 7
Among these exceptions are the "independent source" and the "attenuated
link" doctrines. 8
The attenuated link doctrine is attributed to the case of Nardone v.
United States."9 In Nardone the defendant was tried and convicted of tax fraud
but his conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court'" because the prosecu-
tion gained evidence through illegal wiretaps.' The government retried Nar-
done. This time the conversations were not admitted but the trial court al-
lowed the prosecution to use the knowledge gained from them. Nardone was
again convicted and again the Supreme Court reversed, prohibiting such
"Note, Fruit o/the Poisonous Free - A Plea/or Relevant Criteria. 115 U. PA. L. RE-v. 1136, 1137 11967).
.See. Annot.. 43 A.L.R.3d 385. 390 119721.
11Id. at 390., Note, Supra note 51, at 1145.
"Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 385, 390 11972). The phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" is credited to Justice Frank-
furter in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338. 341 (19391.
"'Annot.. 43 A.L.R.3d 385. 390 (1972).
-.See, Pitler. "'The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized. 56 ('Ait - L. REv. 579 (1968.
'7United States v. Brookins. 614 F.2d 1037. 1041. (5th Cir. 1980).
"d.
"1308 U.S. 338 119391.
"'Nardone v. United States. 302 U.S. 379 11937).
°Id. at 339.
[Vol. 18:2
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derivative use.62 Although the Court held that the knowledge illegally acquired
could not be admitted, it went on to state that in a different case the "connec-
tion [between the illegality and the Government's proof] may have been so at-
tenuated as to dissipate the taint."63 Subsequently, such evidence has been ad-
mitted when the connection between the constitutional violation and the
evidence itself is too remote to serve what are perceived as the deterrent pur-
poses behind the exclusionary rule.64 This doctrine was not examined by the
Supreme Court in Williams, apparently because the evidence was directly ob-
tained through violations of Williams' rights.6
The independent source rule allows admission, because the evidence was
not obtained as the result of a violation but through an unrelated source. 6 This
doctrine evolved from the case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.7
In Silverthorne corporate documents were seized, photographed and copied in
an illegal search of corporate offices by representatives of the Department of
Justice, and the United States Marshall. 8 The government sought to use
against the defendants the knowledge gained in the illegal search even though
the documents themselves could not be used in court. In writing for the Court,
Justice Holmes stated that:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a cer-
tain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean
that facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of
them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any
others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong can-
not be used by it in the way proposed."
The Supreme Court later hinted at yet another exception in the case of
Wong Sun v. United States." In that case several illegal arrests and searches
were made leading to the discovery of narcotics. Over counsel's objections this
evidence was admitted at trial.7' The prosecution acknowledged the evidence
would not have been found absent the illegalities.72 In its holding, the Court
rules that almost all of the evidence was improperly admitted as to all but one
of the defendants.73 In regard to the inadmissible evidence, the Court held that
"Id. at 340-41.
'lid. at 341.
'United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir. 1980).
"Nix v. Williams. 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984).
'Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
Old.
Old. at 390-91.
"Id. at 392.
1371 U.S. 471 (1963).
7 ld. at 477.
721d. at 487.
"Id. at 487, 491.
Fall, 19841 RECENT CASES
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the attentuation and independent source doctrines were not applicable," but
qualified that remark by saying:
We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply
because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the
police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant ob-
jection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or in-
stead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.'75
The Court did not clarify this statement nor explicitly create a new excep-
tion but only concluded that the challenged evidence was "come at by the ex-
ploitation of [the] illegality" and therefore inadmissible.76 Nevertheless, these
words later came to be regarded as allowing admission where the prosecution
can prove that the evidence would "inevitably" discovered.77
In evaluating the above criteria in the Williams case, the Iowa Supreme
Court exhaustively considered relevant case law and comments.78 It carefully
qualified the words "inevitable discovery," finding them over extensive." That
court viewed the doctrine as adjunct to the independent source rule and pre-
ferred the term "hypothetical independent source."8
The Iowa court came to the conclusion that a two part test was necessary
in order to render this exception's application constitutional.8'
First, use of the doctrine should be permitted only when the police have
not acted in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of the evidence in ques-
tion. Second, the State must prove that the evidence would have been
found without the unlawful activity and how that discovery would have
occurred.82
The Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged the "competing interests"83 of en-
forcing the law and protecting constitutional rights, these interests being bal-
anced under the attenuation exception and felt these interests were also rele-
vant to the application of the inevitable discovery exception." It also recog-
"Id. at 487.
'lid. at 488 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt §5.07, at 221 (1959)).
' Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488.
"See, Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984); United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1980); Pitier, supra note 56, at 579.
"State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 256-58 (Iowa 1979).
7
"ld. at 256, n.3.
"Id. at 256, 258.
'lid. at 258.
uld. (citing 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4, at 622 (1978).
'State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d at 258.
mld.
(Vol. 18:2,
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nized the rationale behind the exclusionary rule; deterrence of misconduct, as
well as protection of "judicial integrity."85
The Iowa Supreme Court also intended that prosecutors prove an absence
of bad faith on the part of the police, to fortify the deterrence purposes behind
the exclusionary rule.86 This was a response to criticism that without this re-
quirement police would actively violate citizens' rights in order to precipitate
the discovery of evidence." As to criticism that the rule would be applied in a
reckless manner,8 the court required that the state prove that the evidence
would have been discovered and not that it might have been discovered.89 Fur-
thermore, it insisted such a showing result from the record of each case under
consideration and not by analogy to other cases of factual similarity.8 Lastly,
the Iowa Supreme Court noted that in Iowa added protection is offered the ac-
cused because where findings are challenged on appeal in that state, appellate
courts review determinations of both law and fact de novo. 1 The Iowa
Supreme Court then went on to affirm Williams' second conviction, on the
grounds that the body would have been discovered regardless of Leaming's un-
constitutional actions and therefore the deterrence aspect of the exclusionary
rule would serve no purpose.92
Williams again sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa and again on the grounds that his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and sixth amendment right to
counsel were contravened by the admission of the evidence.9" This time the
district court denied the writ.94 It agreed with the Iowa Supreme Court that the
'lid. at 259.
8Id.
"The Iowa court realized that police "bad faith" was a highly nebulous concept:
Obviously, bad faith means something more than just acting unlawfully, for if the police action was
unlawful the issue would never have arisen in the first place. And the question of bad faith may re-
quire different treatment, depending on the nature of the lawless action taken by the police. That is,
the initial unlawful activity might, for example, be a violation of either the fourth, the fifth or the
sixth amendments. Police action taken solely to avoid the warrant clause of the fourth amendment,
might well provide a clear cut case for refusal to apply the inevitable discovery exception. In such a
situation the application of inevitable discovery would result in the deletion of the warrant clause
from the fourth amendment because that clause's sole purpose is to insert a magistrate between the
proposed subject of the search and police officers who assert probable cause for the search. By this
discussion we do not mean that violations of the fourth amendment will receive any greater or lesser
scrutiny than violations of other constitutional safeguards. Rather, we intend only to illustrate what
we mean when we refer to bad faith on the part of the police.
Id.
mid.
"Id. at 260 (emphasis in original).
"Id.
'd.: Armento v. Baughman, 290 N.W.2d II, 15 (Iowa 19801: State v. Ege, 274 N.W.2d 350, 352 llowa
1979).
"State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d at 262.
"Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664. 666 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
"Id. at 675.
RECENT CASESFall, 19841
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deterrence purposes of the exclusionary rule were preserved by the Iowa
court's requirements that the prosecution prove discovery inevitable and that
the police did not act in bad faith."
This denial was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, which reversed the district court on the basis that Learning
violated Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel. " A rehearing en banc
was denied. 7
Although the circuit court "assumed, without deciding, that there [was]
an inevitable discovery exception to the Exclusionary Rule,"98 it held that the
good faith requirement imposed by the Iowa Supreme Court was not even con-
sidered by the trial court." Nor did the circuit court consider whether the
record supported the conclusion that the discovery of the body was inevitable
or whether the preponderance standard was proper."
The case reached the Supreme Court for the second time as Iowa appealed
the Eighth Circuit's ruling. The Supreme Court granted certiorari'"' to consider
whether admission of evidence under an inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule is proper.101
In this new decision the Court recognized and adopted the inevitable
discovery doctrine" 3 but explicitly negated the Iowa Supreme Court's good
faith requirement"' and accepted the preponderance standard."'
After reviewing the facts, Chief Justice Burger recognized that Silver-
thorne'" barred derivative as well as direct evidence when obtained in viola-
tion of the Constitution. 7 He went on to state that the exception delineated in
Wong Sun 0 1 "pointedly negated the kind of good faith requirement advanced
by the Court of Appeals in reviewing the District Court."'09
It is entirely unclear how the Court reached this conclusion. At no point
in the Wong Sun opinion does that Court mention the good faith or the bad
'Id. at 670.
'Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1173 18th Cir. 1983).
'"Id. at 1175.
11ld. at 1169.
'Id.
t"Id.
"
0
'Cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2427 (1983).
'Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2504 (1984).
1111d. at 2509.
'
0 id. at 2510.
1"Ild. at 2509.
'"Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
'Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2508.
" Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
'"Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2508.
[Vol. 18:2
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faith of the police officers involved. Indeed, though the Wong Sun Court did
not expressly condemn the officers' conduct in that case, that opinion is replete
with references to police misconduct and constitutional violations."" The
quote in Wong Sun, implying a third possible exception to the exclusionary
rule"' and referred to by the Chief Justice in the instant case," 2 does not ad-
dress the good faith/bad faith issue but merely implies a further exception to
the exclusionary rule without elaboration.
Next, the Court held that evidence derived from a violation of a suspect's
rights was inadmissible in a sixth amendment context as well as in fourth and
fifth amendment violations."3 In doing so the Court confirmed that the exclu-
sionary rule was meant to protect rights guaranteed by the Constitution and to
deter misconduct by preventing the state from using evidence if illegality ob-
tained. "'
The Court then went on to contrast the exclusionary rule to the
"derivative evidence analysis," apparently referring to the attenuation and in-
dependent source rules."5 It is not clear what the Court meant in this com-
parison. The Court stated that "the derivative evidence analysis ensures that
the prosecution is not put in a worse position simply because of some earlier
police error or misconduct." '6 Admittedly, the independent source exception to
the rule which would allow use of derivative evidence had no application in the
instant case because Williams' statements "indeed led police to the child's body
. However, the Chief Justice continued, stating:
The independent source doctrine teaches us that the interest of society in
deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries
receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting
the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been if
no police error or misconduct had occurred. See Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm 'n of New York Harbor: Kastigar v. United States."18
The two above cited cases deal with the privilege of the accused to avoid
self incrimination under the fifth amendment. In Murphy the Court held that
"
0E.g.. arrest without probable cause and without a warrant, unlawful entries into a house and bedroom.
and unlawful search. Wong Sun. 371 U.S. at 479, 48 1, 484, 485.
"Id. at 487-88.
"'Nix v. Williams. 104 S. Ct. at 2508.
"'ld. In the sixth amendment context the Court cited United States v. Wade. 388 U.S. 218 11967). l4ade
dealt with an in-court identification in which a witness relied on an earlier out of court identification. imper-
missibly conducted in the absence of counsel.
"'Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2508-09.
"AId. at 2509.
"'Id. (emphasis in original).
11 7/d.
...Id. Citing, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor. 378 U.S. 52 11964) and Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 11972).
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a witness in a state proceeding could not be compelled to testify if the
testimony might be used against him in a later federal action."' Also:
Iln order to implement this constitutional rule and accommodate the in-
terests of the State and Federal Governments in investigating and pros-
ecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited from making
any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits. This exclusionary rule,
while permitting the States to secure information necessary for effective
law enforcement, leaves the witness and the Federal Government in
substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege
in the absence of a state grant of immunity.'20
The Kastigar'2' Court considered the scope of such immunity in the con-
text of the fifth amendment privilege citing the Murphy passage above, almost
verbatim.'22 Both Courts disallowed derivative use of incriminating evidence
unless gained from an independent source.'23 Neither Court mandated that ex-
clusion be orchestrated so as to avoid a disadvantage to the government. A for-
tiori, the application of the exclusionary rule places the state in a worse posi-
tion and is not designed to balance competing interests but instead to castigate
the state and its agents in order to prevent future wrongs.'24
Furthermore, in the case here under consideration, the Court did not feel
that denial of admission would serve the purpose of deterrence. The Chief
Justice stated that "la] police officer who is faced with the opportunity to ob-
tain evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate whether
the evidence sought would inevitably be discovered."'25 He continued, that
"[on] the other hand, when an officer is aware that the evidence will inevitably
be discovered, he will try to avoid engaging in a questionable practice. In that
situation, there will be little to gain from taking any dubious 'shortcuts' to ob-
tain the evidence.' 26
The argument that there is no deterrence where evidence will inevitably
be discovered regardless of illegal actions on the part of the police is said to
have "a certain appeal."'27 However, new dangers are implicit in the assertion
that the deterrence rationale will remain unaffected. Police may be encouraged
to violate suspects' rights in order to discover physical evidence. The.prosecu-
tion could easily prove this evidence "would" have been discovered through
""Murphy v. Water Comm'n of New York Harbor. 378 U.S. 52 (19641.
'"Ild. at 79.
"Kastigar v. United States. 406 U.S. 441 (19721.
'I:/d. at 457. lemphasis addedl.
'
2
'Murphv 378 U.S. at 79 n. 18: Kasligar 406 U.S. at 457.
':'C/ Wong Sun 371 U.S. at 484-86.
2' Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2510.
':"Id. Ct. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268. 283 119781 (Burger. C.., concurring).
'
2
'Pitier. supra note 51 at 630.
[Vol. 18:2
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the use of sophisticated laboratory techniques.'28 Perhaps confessions will be
forced, the police being aware that the incriminating statements are not ad-
missible but that evidence derived therefrom will be, 2' as happened in the in-
stant case. It is also likely that where police are quite confident evidence will be
found they will be tempted to precipitate results saving themselves time, trou-
ble and some uncertainty in the process.38
In the instant case Detective Learning knew that a massive search was be-
ing conducted but that Williams would only reveal the location of the body to
his attorney. 3' If Learning was willing to risk exclusion under the sanctions
then extant, why should another officer be less likely to act in a similar fashion
now that the Court has adopted this exception?
The fact that some police officers do not respond to the past dictates of
the Supreme Court seems little reason for a weakening of the exclusionary
rule. Incongruity also appears in the words of the Court's rationale themselves.
The Chief Justice first stated that an officer "rarely if ever" will know if
evidence will be discovered, yet went on to state that this rare or never occur-
ring event will deter misconduct.' The Court also felt that civil actions and
intra-department disciplinary proceedings against offending police officers
would serve to deter. The failure of these remedies in the past though was one
of the reasons for the Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule to begin with.33
Justice Stevens was dissatisfied with the majority opinion.'34 He noted
that the violation affected the adversarial process'35 but felt that by shifting to
the state the burden of proving the discovery inevitable, the good or bad faith
of the police is made irrelevant.'36 He spoke here of the violation as creating
"uncertainty" in the adversarial process. '3 This then leads to the question of
whether the exclusionary rule is meant to deter misconduct or meant merely to
avoid "uncertainty." Uncertainty could also be avoided by giving the state
license to proceed in disregard of constitutional guarantees but unfortunately
such a concept is anathema to fundamental American jurisprudence.3 Fur-
thermore, in speaking of protecting this adversarial process, it must be noted
that the process began when Williams took his attorneys' advice and voluntari-
1281d
"
'12 1d. at 620.
'1'State V. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 259 (Iowa 1979).
"'Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 398, 408 (Marshall. J.. concurringi.
1Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2510.
"'Maguire, Supra note 50 at 308.
'Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2513. (Stevens, J. concurring.
"
3
'Id. at 2514.
'lid. at 2515.
'11d. at 2516.
"'Williams, v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1173 18th Cir. 1982).
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ly surrendered. 3 ' Justice Stevens himself noted that Leaming's action threat-
ened the adversary process in Williams .1'
In his dissent Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, was
concerned about the employment of a preponderance standard instead of re-
quiring the clear and convincing evidence standard. 4' He noted that although
the discovery of evidence under the independent source doctrine rests on fact,
the inevitable discovery rule necessitates a hypothetical finding.' 2 Indeed, the
record of the Williams case, though sparse in the various opinions, could
justify such a clear and convincing evidence standard.
The search for the body was conducted by two hundred volunteers in the
middle of winter.' 3 At the suppression hearing prior to Williams' second trial,
the agent in charge of the search testified that he had obtained maps of two
counties, marked them off in grids and had assigned a team of four to six
searchers to each grid.' 4 The search was called off at approximately 3:00 p.m.
of the same day after Williams was induced to cooperate.' 5 The agent had not
even marked the map of the county where the body was found but testified he
would have done so if "necessary.' 46 He also testified that it would have taken
the searchers an added three to five hours to reach the point where the body
was actually found.'47
Therefore, if the search was indeed called off at 3:00 p.m., an additional
three to five hours of searching would necessarily mean that the body's loca-
tion could not have been reached until long after dark. With the further im-
pediment of "ominous weather"'48 the search would have been hampered even
more. It should also be noted that this testimony was given approximately
eight years after the events in question. Further inconsistencies in the physical
'Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 390.
10 Underlying the surface issues in this case is the question whether a fugitive from justice can rely on
his lawyer's advice given in connection with a decision to surrender voluntarily. The defendent placed
his trust in an experienced Iowa trial lawyer who in turn trusted the Iowa law enforcement
authorities to honor a commitment made during negotiations which led to the apprehension of a
potentially dangerous person. Under any analysis, this was a critical stage of the proceeding in which
the participation of an independent professional was of vital importance to the accused and to society.
At this stage - as in countless others in which the law profoundly affects the life of the individual -
the lawyer is the essential medium through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are
communicated to the citizen. If, in the long run, we are seriously concerned about the individual's ef-
fective representation by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise to this lawyer.
Id. at 415 (Stevens, J. concurring).
"'Nix v. Williams. 104 S. Ct. at 2517 (Brennan, J., dissenting.
I 21d
Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2504.
"Id. at 2512.
"'5d.
I"Id.
"
7 d
"'Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 412 11977). (Powell, J., concurring).
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evidence itself are discussed in the opinion of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, in its reversal of the district court's refusal to grant
the second writ of habeas corpus.14' Nevertheless, three lower courts and the
Supreme Court were "satisfied" that the body would have inevitably been dis-
covered.5 ' The adoption of this lowest of evidentiary standards is one of the
most disconcerting aspects of the case. The Chief Justice was satisfied that in-
justice was avoided by placing the burden of proof on the state.' However, in
practice it is the defendant, faced with the enormous investigatory resources of
the state, as well as its greater credibility, who must "show that the police offi-
cers would not have discovered the challenged evidence 'but for' the illegal...
conduct."'5 2
Another disturbing aspect of the case is how broadly the Court's opinion
can be read. While previous exceptions to the exclusionary rule focus on the
admission of derivative evidence, the holding in the instant case could allow
the admission of even primary evidence. Indeed, although the Court based its
ruling on the sixth amendment violation,'53 the challenged evidence could only
be considered derivative in that context. The evidence also results from a
primary illegality in a fifth amendment context, in that Williams directed the
police to the body.
If primary evidence will now be admitted under this doctrine, then "the
inevitable discovery exception [may] swallow the exclusionary rule itself."'' 4 In
the hope that lower courts will not be inclined to abrogate the exclusionary
rule, the defense attorney faced with the application of this new doctrine
should argue that the challenged evidence is primary in nature thus more prop-
erly subject to exclusion.' He should also vehemently question the state's
assertions of the "inevitability" of the discovery.
In conclusion, the Court's ruling here endorses a further exception to the
exclusionary rule. Even where police misconduct is intentional and drastically
contravenes long established constitutional rights, the prosecution will be per-
"'Williams claimed that someone else killed the girl and left her body in his room to shift the blame to him.
The circuit court of appeals said this "theory is not so far-fetched as it sounds." Even though the state claim-
ed that the murder was sexually related, and that the cold preserved the evidence, no chemical components
of spermatozoa were found. This implies that a sterile man attacked the girl. Williams was not sterile. The
FBI said pubic hairs "like" Williams' were found on the body, but so were pubic hairs unlike both Williams'
or the victim's. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1168 f8th Cir. 1982).
"Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2511. Ironically, even a proponent of the inevitable discovery exception
argues that it is imperative that the prosecution affirmatively prove the evidence would have been
discovered, not only that it might have been discovered. Maguire, Supra note 50 at 315.
"'Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2511.
".Note, Supra note 51 at If143.
"'Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2510-11. It is not clear from the opinion whether or not Williams' counsel
renewed his fifth amendment argument or whether the Court merely found its determination unnecessary.
"'Pitler, Supra note 56 at 650.
"'Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 385, 390 (1972).
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mitted to introduce evidence resulting directly from the violation, so long as it
can convince the trier of fact that more likely than not, the evidence would
have been uncovered without the improper actions of the police. Thus, the
holding in the instant case rewards the state despite the illegal actions of its
agents. Some might question whether law enforcement, indeed justice itself,
might be harmed rather than enhanced by its result.
Opponents of the exclusionary rule are likely to view this decision as a
triumph for law and order, one which will prevent guilty persons from escap-
ing punishment. Supporters of the rule will, in contrast, be concerned with the
possibility that incidents of serious police misconduct will increase and that the
already considerable power of the state will be enlarged to the detriment of the
innocent individual. Only time will tell to what extent the lower courts will ap-
ply the exception and under what circumstances. Until that time it will not be
known to what degree the exclusionary rule, so hotly debated for so many
years, has been undermined by this decision.
JOHN V. BOGGINS
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